Nobody seems interested in asking why the terrorists didn’t use or allege to have used chemical weapons before they were on the brink of ultimate defeat, nor why “Israel” would wait until this very last moment to carry out a feeble airstrike on a single military base that changed nothing at all in terms of the war’s overall dynamics.
By now everyone is aware that “Israel” struck a Syrian base in the early hours of the morning with several missiles in response to the latest false flag chemical weapons attack to occur in the country, but the timing of these provocations leaves a lot of unanswered questions that nobody seems willing to answer, let alone in the Alt-Media informational space. The terrorists evidently had the chemical weapons in their possession the entire time but waited until they were on the brink of defeat before either using them or pretending to have done so, which defies conventional “logic” that suggests they would have “saved their own skin” through this scenario much sooner than at this desperate moment.
Instead, the Russian presidential election – which would have been the perfect time to stage such an operation for maximum destabilizing effect – came and went without a hitch, and the retreating “rebels” reportedly left behind incriminating chemical weapons laboratories in the Damascus suburbs that they could have either destroyed or utilized to stop the Syrian Arab Army’s (SAA) liberation advance. Nothing of the sort happened, nor did the US and its allies like “Israel” intervene to save their proxy forces. For all intents and purposes, they appear to have made a deliberate decision to hold off on this false flag provocation and its preplanned military follow-up aggressions even though it would have been more “opportune” for them to have staged everything weeks ago.
Should this interpretation be accurate – and thus far no information has emerged to contradict the narrative being presented in this analysis – then it would mean that something happened within the past week that served as a “deal-breaker” for triggering the present scenario at the very last moment that it could realistically be put into motion. Before attempting to answer what that might have been, it should be accepted that some kind of tacit “understanding” was indeed in play between Russia and its Western rivals and which was respected by both sides up until last week in indefinitely delaying the chemical weapons false flag chain reaction that’s currently unfolding, and which could have realistically occurred much earlier for maximum destabilizing effect.
Furthermore, Russia’s reaction to “Israel’s” latest bombing proves that it intends to continue its pattern of behavior in passively allowing Tel Aviv to carry out attacks against the Arab Republic so long as it’s supposedly doing so on an implied anti-Iranian basis, an unofficial ‘agreement’ that the author described in depth in his September 2017 analysis rhetorically questioning whether anyone still thinks that Russia and “Israel” aren’t allies. This time, just like every single other time that “Israel” struck Syria, Iranian and/or Hezbollah units were reportedly killed, thus adding credence to the speculative observation in explaining why Russia refused to proactively stop the most recent incoming attack. This, however, doesn’t mean that Russia wanted it to happen, but just that it accepted that it would.
The question once again returns to why “Israel” waited so long to stage what the Syrian Foreign Ministry officially said was Tel Aviv’s “indirect response to the success of the Syrian Arab Army in eliminating armed terrorist groups from the Damascus suburbs and other Syrian areas” when it could have done so much earlier knowing for a fact as it has for two and a half years already that Russia wouldn’t intervene. It also makes one wonder why the chemical weapons false flag happened so late when the terrorists were on the brink of defeat and not before then like “logic” would have otherwise dictated, given that they evidently had the means to do this the entire time and everything that’s followed was clearly choreographed well in advance.
The “Deal” That Never Was
While it can never be known for sure, the answer is probably what the author speculated in his analysis last night titled “Tick-Tock, Time’s Up: What Will Syria Do?”, during which the question was posed of whether or not everything is happening because of President Assad’s reported refusal to attend last week’s Tripartite meeting in Ankara. After all, that’s the only possible event that could have been the “deal-breaker” that got the US and its allies to change their mind this weekend by pulling out of whatever “gentlemen’s agreement” they could have had with Russia and stage the latest provocation at the last possible moment that they were realistically able to while they still had their assets in place.
To expand on this theory and channel a key point in the aforementioned analysis, Russia might have assured the US that it could guarantee President Assad’s attendance at the event as proof of his government’s sincere desire to make some kind of tangible progress in the Syrian peace process unlike the “dilly-dallying” that it’s suspected of doing in the past 15 months since the Russian-written “draft constitution” was first presented. Accepting the “legitimacy” of Turkish-backed proxy “rebels” in Idlib, Afrin, and Al-Bab would have implied the inevitable reversal of Damascus’ erstwhile insistence on retaining the constitutional unity of the state and its “compromise” in agreeing to “decentralization”, which could also resolve the country’s “Kurdish Question” as well.
In exchange for this “concession”, the US might have withdrawn its troops from Al-Tanf to east of the Euphrates, while Washington and Ankara would have “accepted” that Assad could remain in office. Pro-“Israeli” “rebels” would have probably still retained their occupied territory in southwestern Syria in de-facto expanding the Zionist occupation zone further inland, but that issue could have been “officially” addressed later, just like the US’ hopes that Damascus would remove Iranian and Hezbollah troops from the Arab Republic. All that each of the foreign powers involved in Syria aside from Iran needed to see at this moment was that President Assad would prove his “flexibility” in “compromising” on at least one issue during his “anticipated” trip to Ankara, but alas it wasn’t to be.
Hell Hath No Fury Like An Amero-Zionist Scorned
It can only be guessed whether or not – and if so, how – Russia might have convinced the US and its allies that President Assad would attend the Ankara Summit, but going with what would have been this game-changing idea for a moment, it would in retrospect explain why they delayed their false flag chemical weapons scenario for so long and only went forward with it after their expectations were crushed following the Syrian leader’s refusal to “play his role”. Should this have been the case, then “Israel’s” feeble missile strike would have just been a message to Moscow that it had better get Damascus to acquiesce to some kind of political “compromise” as soon as possible otherwise something much worse might be in store for the Arab Republic.
That might be why Trump just dramatically declared that “major decisions on Syria” would come in the next 24-48 hours (and which might be carried out jointly with France in de-facto making it a NATO operation) in order to put maximum pressure on Russia to force some tangible “concessions” from Syria, more than likely in the direction of a 2013-like “last minute solution” to avert a massive strike. This time, instead of surrendering its chemical weapons, it could potentially be “convinced” to sacrifice its alliance with Iran and Hezbollah by announcing that their services are no longer needed in the country following President Putin’s recent reaffirmation that Daesh has been militarily defeated. Truthfully, there isn’t anything else that Syria could probably do to prevent what might be to come.
First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council’s Committee on International Affairs Vladimir Jabarov made it clear last year when Trump first bombed Syria that “Russia has no intentions to use its Aerospace Forces against US missiles if Washington decides to carry out new strikes in Syria as it could lead to a large-scale war”. Bearing this in mind and reassessing what just happened, “Israel’s” feeble strike this morning can be read as a “test run” for identifying the true strength of Syria’s air defense units and to ensure that Moscow won’t interfere so long as “deconfliction mechanisms” are successfully employed to guarantee the safety of its Syrian-based servicemen, thus avoiding the “tripwire” that would necessitate a Russian military response no matter what.
What all of this implies is that the next 24-48 hours will be absolutely pivotal for Syria’s survival as a state because the US is evidently planning a major strike against it after losing patience with President Assad’s lack of willingness to “compromise” during the 15-month-long Russian-led peace process, and the Pentagon believes that its “test run” last year and the one that “Israel” just pulled off earlier this morning prove that the Russian military won’t stand in its way by risking World War III to stop it. President Assad’s reported refusal to attend the latest Tripartite meeting in Ankara was the “last straw” that convinced them that they have nothing at all to gain by indefinitely delaying their planned chemical weapons false flag provocation and resultant follow-up aggressions any longer.
Presuming that the educated guesses presented in this analysis are accurate to a certain degree and more or less reflect the general course of events that led up to the present crisis, then the only foreseeable action that could avert the coming catastrophe in Syria is if Damascus acquiesces to Moscow’s “suggestions” in making immediate and tangible “concessions” towards the peace process in the direction of “decentralization” and the phased removal of Iranian & Hezbollah forces from the country. It’s difficult to think of anything else that could satiate the US and “Israel’s” desire for a larger war, one which Russia already declared last year that it wants no part of, but judging by what happened since 2013, this might only “buy more time” for Syria until its enemies demand something more from it again in the future.
DISCLAIMER: The author writes for this publication in a private capacity which is unrepresentative of anyone or any organization except for his own personal views. Nothing written by the author should ever be conflated with the editorial views or official positions of any other media outlet or institution.